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I. INTRODUCTION

The new sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code (MPC)
forcefully assert the nature of sentencing as judicial province. “One
underlying philosophy of the revised Code is that sentencing is, at its core,
a judicial function.”1 Specifically, the new provisions aim to secure
judicial discretion against unwelcome intrusions such as legislatively
mandated minimum sentences, the more rigid forms of sentencing
guidelines, a renewed emphasis on the role of the jury, and public demands
for harsher sentences.
But why, exactly, is sentencing a fundamentally judicial task? What
sort of task is sentencing, anyway? Perhaps choosing the right punishment
for an offender is an art, a matter of phronesis or practical wisdom. On this
account, sentencing takes practice, skill, and inevitably, judgment. But
there are other possibilities. Sentencing may be science rather than art; it
may require the analysis of empirical data, and the question of appropriate
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. This Article was prepared for
presentation at a panel on the Model Penal Code Sentencing Project at the January 2009 annual
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. For lively conversation and helpful
comments, I am grateful to panel convener Christopher Slobogin and to my fellow panelists Doug
Berman, Kevin Reitz, and Bob Weisberg.
1. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.02 cmt. b, at 63 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007);
see also id. at 306 (“[A] driving philosophy of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing revision is that
the judiciary should be the . . . most powerful institution within the multilevel, multi-actor system
for criminal sentencing.”).
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punishment may be one for which there are objectively ascertainable right
and wrong answers. Or perhaps sentencing is a science in the sense that
Alexis de Tocqueville invoked when he described lawyers as “masters of a
science,” an enterprise requiring “certain habits of order, a taste for
formalities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular connection of
ideas.”2 To think like a (proper) sentencer, maybe one needs to think like a
lawyer, and not like a partisan advocate, but a neutral jurist—a judge.
This Article examines the several and sometimes contradictory
accounts of sentencing in the new MPC provisions. The seeming
dichotomy between art and science is not the only contrast that may
illuminate an inquiry into the nature of sentencing. One might also
distinguish between an account of sentencing as a complex legal and
political process, on one hand, and normative claims about the purposes of
punishment, on the other. Briefly, I argue here that the new Code is at its
best when it acknowledges the legal and political complexities of
sentencing, and at its worst when it invokes the rhetoric of desert. When
the Code focuses on the sentencing process in political context, it offers
opportunities to deploy both practical wisdom and empirical analysis that
may actually make American sentencing less arbitrary and, importantly,
less frequent. When the Code retreats to retributive or desert theory as a
source of sentencing reform, it appeals to indeterminate and unpredictable
principles that threaten to undermine the new provisions’ more salutary
proposals.
Another avenue of inquiry would examine sentencing through the
interplay of theory and practice. We might ask whether a theory of
punishment can produce a theory of sentencing, one which could in turn
provide a useful guide for sentencing practices. The new Code’s attention
to the intersection of theory and practice takes form in its endorsement of
limiting retributivism. At their best, the arguments collectively termed
“limiting retributivism” have two great virtues. First, they are deeply
concerned with the mechanics of actual sentencing practice, such as
institutional design, empirical data, and interactions between various actors
in a sentencing system. Second, they are (again, at their best) not
particularly retributive. Often, limiting retributivism is not so much a
punishment theory as an account of the uses—and limits—of punishment
theory for sentencing practice. But at their worst, the claims of limiting
retributivism can display all the vices of punishment theory: unsupportable
and unverifiable claims to punitive power, divorced from a broader
political theory and indifferent to the real-world implications of its claims.
This Article examines the relationship between the new Code’s
statement of sentencing purposes and its concrete institutional, procedural,
2. ALEXIS
(1889).

DE

TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY

IN

AMERICA 217 (Bruce Frohmen, ed. 2003)
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and practical recommendations in the remaining proposed revisions. The
danger, I argue, is that the retributive moments of the Code—the moments
when it calls upon decision-makers to think like punishers—will impede
the opportunities it provides for meaningful sentencing reform.
Part II provides an overview of some key features of the revised
sentencing provisions, noting that the most significant change comes not in
the Code’s statement of sentencing purposes but in the interpretation and
implementation of those purposes. Part III examines in detail the
proportionality requirement of the revised Code, with a specific (and
critical) focus on the role of retributivism and desert. Part IV continues the
critique of desert, arguing that the revised Code’s emphasis on desert is in
tension with, and likely to undermine, its professed commitment to more
empirically grounded sentencing practices. Finally, Part V returns to the
question whether sentencing is a distinctively judicial task.
II. FROM PURPOSE TO PRACTICE
Promising “new underpinnings of punishment theory,”3 the revised
sentencing provisions begin with a statement of their own purposes. The
Code first identifies an apparently retributive requirement that punishments
be “proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime
victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders.”4 Other goals—deterrence,
rehabilitation, incapacitation, victim restoration, and community
reintegration—are to be pursued as well, but only “within the boundaries
of proportionality.”5 The new Code also identifies parsimony—a “no more
severe than necessary” provision—as a goal, along with judicial discretion,
individualized sentences, greater uniformity and equality, humane prisons,
and increased attention to empirical research on “the effectiveness of
criminal sanctions as measured against their purposes.”6
Importantly, the new § 1.02 (like its predecessor in the original Code)
identifies the purposes of the sentencing provisions themselves; it is not
framed as a list of the purposes of punishment.7 To understand the
provisions, and to assess their likely impact, it is necessary to keep in mind
this difference between the goals of punishment and the goals of the
sentencing process. Of course, the two categories overlap to some degree,
for one purpose of the sentencing process is to ensure punishments.
3. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxx (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007).
4. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(i). As discussed below, the Code’s drafters are somewhat equivocal on the
relevance of retributive theory to sentencing. See infra text accompanying notes 16–18 and text
accompanying notes 59–66.
5. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii).
6. Id. § 1.02(2)(b)(vii); see also id. § 1.02(2)(a)-(b).
7. Entitled “Purposes; Principles of Construction,” § 1.02(2) identifies “[t]he general
purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all official actors in the sentencing system.”
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Whatever we identify as the purpose of punishment will also be a purpose
of the sentencing process, but the sentencing process may have additional
independent aims. The first part of the new § 1.02(2), subsection (a), lists
several sentencing goals that are also goals of punishment itself:
rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and so forth.8 In contrast,
subsection (b) identifies goals of the sentencing process that are
independent of the purposes of punishment. For example, uniformity
among sentences is not itself a reason to impose punishment; one could
achieve uniform sentences by punishing no one. Similarly, attention to
empirical research on sentence effectiveness may be an aim of the
sentencing process, but it is not itself a reason to punish. The difference
between purposes of punishment and purposes of sentencing procedures is
critical to the Code’s discussion of proportionality, as I elaborate below.
In the five years since new draft provisions were first released, this
statement of purposes has attracted more commentary than any other
aspect of the Code. The attention is somewhat surprising, given that the
revisions to § 1.02(2) are much less radical than the remainder of the
proposed revisions. Like the new § 1.02, the original § 1.02 urged the
pursuit of utilitarian goals within apparently deontological limits.9 Like the
new § 1.02, the original § 1.02 aimed at differentiated sentences that
corresponded to the relative severity of different offenses.10 Like the new
§ 1.02, the original § 1.02 emphasized judicial discretion, individualized
sentences, and reliance on empirical research.11 Meet the new Code, same
as the old Code.
More precisely, meet the new § 1.02, substantially similar to the old
§ 1.02. While the stated purposes of the sentencing provisions have not
changed radically, the interpretation and implementation of these purposes
are significantly different in the new Code.

8. Subsection (a) of 1.02(2) is ostensibly concerned with the “general purposes of sentencing
in individual cases,” whereas subsection (b) is concerned with the purposes of the system as a
whole. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.XX cmt. b., at 267 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
But it would not be quite accurate to explain subsection (a) as a statement of the purposes of
punishment (which are also purposes of the sentencing system). Included in subsection (a) is a
parsimony principle—“to render sentences no more severe than necessary”—and parsimony is not
itself a reason to punish. See id. § 1.02(2)(a)(iii).
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a)-(c) (1962) (identifying utilitarian goals of
prevention, correction, and rehabilitation, along with “safeguard[ing] offenders against excessive,
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment”). The prohibition of excessive or disproportionate
punishments was understood by its drafters to set forth limitations defined by “a common sense of
justice.” Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
465, 468 (1961). For further discussion, see infra note 21.
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(e) (1962).
11. Id. § 1.02(2)(e) (“to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization
in their treatment”); § 1.02(2)(g) (“to advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and
knowledge in the sentencing and treatment of offenders”).
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A. A New Understanding of Proportionality
First, with respect to interpretation: notwithstanding the reference to
excessive and disproportionate sentences in the original Code, the drafters
of the new provisions clearly view their proportionality limitation as an
innovation. The new § 1.02 is said to “incorporate[] meaningful
proportionality limitations not envisioned in the original Code.” 12 Perhaps
the emphasis is on the word meaningful; indeed, the proportionality
limitation of the old Code had little practical effect.13 To make
proportionality meaningful, the new Code offers a retributive or quasiretributive interpretation of it. Sentences should be “within a range of
severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime
victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders.”14 As explained in the
commentary, this account of proportionality is explicitly drawn from
theories of limiting retributivism, under which the offender’s desert sets
upper and lower limits to the sentence.15 Within those outer limits,
sentencers may take into account utilitarian considerations other than
desert. The new Code is somewhat equivocal on the extent to which it
endorses retributive principles; the drafters do not include “retribution” or
even “desert” in the recommended statutory language.16 The new draft
explicitly declines to “codify a ‘just deserts’ philosophy of criminal
penalties.”17 Notwithstanding this unease with the rhetoric of retribution
and just deserts, the commentary indicates that the drafters understand
proportionality to be a retributive concept.18
This interpretation of proportionality is new to the Code. The original
Code made no mention of desert or retribution in its statement of purposes,
and its explanatory notes seemed to reject desert explicitly.19 The original
12. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. a, at 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
13. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii–xxix
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
14. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
15. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. a-b, at 3–8 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007).
16. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), Reporter’s Note, at 30 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 2007) (“The revised Model Penal Code avoids use of the term ‘retribution’ . . . and speaks instead
of ‘proportionality’ constraints on utilitarian sanctions.”).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. i., at 17 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
18. See, e.g., id. § 1.02(2), Reporter’s Note 29 (equating proportionality limits with retributive
limits); id. § 6B.03 cmt. b., at 179 (referring to the factors relevant to proportionality—offense
gravity, harm to victims, and offender blameworthiness—as “retributive anchor points”); id.
§ 6B.03 cmt. c., at 181 (noting a widespread trend “toward a hybrid approach of retributive and
utilitarian goals in sentencing reform” and endorsing that trend).
19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. 3, at 227 (1962) (rejecting desert and retribution as bases
for imposing imprisonment).
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Code did, as noted above, codify a proportionality limitation whose
meaning was apparently derived from “the common sense of justice,”20 but
justice was not conflated with desert: it was widely understood that the
Code rejected desert as a sentencing principle.21 Contemporary members
of the American Law Institute (ALI)—and contemporary sentencing
theorists—would do well to revisit the notion that concepts of
proportionality (and justice) can stand independently of claims of desert.
As discussed in Part III, the new Code reflects an unfortunate and
unfounded assumption that proportionality is a necessarily retributive
principle. One way to understand the difference between the old and the
new proportionality is that the old proportionality requirement was a goal
of the sentencing system, independent of the goals of punishment, whereas
the new proportionality requirement is linked to a retributive account of
the purpose of punishment itself.
B. New Roles for Commissions and Judges
The new statement of sentencing purposes is not a mere hortatory
throat-clearing to precede the meat of the new provisions. The drafters are
explicit about their intention to make § 1.02 relevant to the entire
sentencing process, and they offer concrete guidance toward that end.22
Here, I want to focus on the implementation of the proportionality
requirement, especially as it interacts with the commitment to judicial
discretion, and the implementation of the new Code’s commitment to
“evidence-based sentencing.”
Who should decide how much punishment is proportionate to a given
20. Wechsler, supra note 9, at 468.
21. See, e.g., Norval Morris, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code: Balancing the
Concerns, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 811, 814–15 n.12 (1987) (“The Comment specifically rejects as a valid
reason for imprisonment that the person ‘deserves’ punishment for the bad deed committed.” (citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. 3, at 227 (1985))). As retributive theory became more popular
among Anglo-American academics in the late twentieth century, some scholars argued that the
Model Penal Code implicitly reflected retributive principles. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Criminal
Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 287, 290 (2001) (identifying desert
as one of several purposes embraced by the original MPC). The commentary to the MPC was
revised in 1985, and the new commentary contained language that could be interpreted as leaving
room for desert as a non-determinative, secondary sentencing principle. For example, the 1985
comments explained that the Code was “based on the premise that ‘desert’ alone is not a sufficient
justification for punishment.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Introduction to Art. 6 and
7, at 16 (1985); see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.02 cmt. 3, at 21 (stating that
the Code was focused on crime prevention, “leaving no room for dispositions motivated merely by
vindictive or retributive considerations.”). For more discussion of the revisionist retributivist
reading of the Code, see Michele Cotton, Back With A Vengeance: The Resilience of Retributivism
as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. C RIM. L. REV. 1313, 1318–24 (2000).
22. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. a, at 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007); id. § 7.ZZ cmt. b, at 322–23 (noting “the revised Code’s broad-based effort to give greater
prominence and effect to the purposes provision than in the 1962 Code”).
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offense? Though the proportionality requirement of the new § 1.02 is, by
its own terms, intended to guide all “official actors” in the sentencing
process, judges and sentencing commissions are most explicitly charged
with ensuring proportionate sentences. The new Code recommends the
creation of a permanent sentencing commission that will “set presumptive
sentences for defined classes of cases” in accordance with offense gravity,
harm to victims, and offender blameworthiness—the same proportionality
factors identified in § 1.02.23 The commentary explains that this task
entails a moral judgment and is necessarily imprecise, but, consistent with
the theory of limiting retributivism, the commission is expected to “find
agreement that a defined presumptive sentencing range for each category
of case is safely within the outer limits of undue lenity or severity.”24
Further, the commission should devise guidelines that “invite sentencing
courts to individualize sentencing decisions in light of the purposes in §
1.02(2)(a),” and the guidelines may prioritize among the various principles
of § 1.02(2)(a).25 Again, the commentary is fairly specific in its
recommendations for implementing proportionality. For example, a twodimensional sentencing grid “can assist the commission in the goal of
furthering proportionality in punishment across different offenses.”26
Judges, too, are empowered to make real the Code’s commitment to
proportionate sentences, and their power in this regard exceeds that of the
sentencing commission. In general, trial court judges are to exercise their
sentencing authority consistent with § 1.02. More specifically, judges may
depart from the guidelines “when substantial circumstances establish that
the presumptive sentence . . . will not best effectuate the purposes stated in
§ 1.02(2)(a).”27 This provision seems to give judges power to overrule the
sentencing commission on issues of proportionality, except the new Code
provides that judges may not depart from the guidelines based on “mere
disagreement” about the appropriate sentence for ordinary cases.28 Instead,
departures should occur only when aggravating or mitigating “factors take
the case outside the realm” of the ordinary cases anticipated by the
guidelines.29 Judges are further empowered to render “extraordinary
departures” from otherwise mandatory sentences when “extraordinary and
compelling circumstances demonstrate . . . that the mandatory penalty
would result in an unreasonable sentence in light of the purposes in
23. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.03(2), at 178 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); see
also id. § 6.A.01 (requiring establishment of permanent sentencing commission to develop
sentencing guidelines).
24. Id. § 6B.03 cmt. b., at 180 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
25. Id. § 6B.03(4)–(5), at 178.
26. Id. § 6B.02 cmt. c., at 163.
27. Id. § 7.XX(2), at 264.
28. Id. § 7.XX(2)(b), at 264.
29. Id. § 7.XX(2)(a), at 264.
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§ 1.02(2)(a).”30 These two departure standards—“substantial
circumstances” for most departures and “compelling circumstances” for
extraordinary departures from purportedly mandatory sentences—give
sentencing courts considerable power to implement their judgments of
proportionality. This allocation of power reflects “a driving philosophy” of
the revised Code that “the judiciary should be the central and most
powerful institution within the multilevel, multi-actor system for criminal
sentencing.”31
A proposed section on appellate review of sentences would give the
judiciary still greater power to assess and impose proportionate sentences.
Under the draft § 7.ZZ, a defendant may appeal a sentence on the ground
that it is “too severe,” and the appellate court is empowered to vacate or
modify the sentence if the court finds it to be disproportionate given the
factors articulated in § 1.02(2)(a)—offense gravity, victim harm, and
offender blameworthiness.32 This “subconstitutional proportionality
review” is envisioned by the drafters of the new Code to provide “greater
bite” than the weak proportionality requirement that federal courts have
found in the Eighth Amendment.33 The commentary faults the Eighth
Amendment standard as “flexible” in its consideration of both retributive
and utilitarian goals of punishment and contrasts the Eighth Amendment
standard to the Code’s proportionality requirement, which is based on “the
standard indices of retributive or deserved penalties.”34 Thus, in this
appellate review provision, one sees the hope that retribution will provide
stronger limits to sentence severity than other punishment theories. As I
discuss in the following part, that hope is misplaced.
On the account in the new MPC sentencing provisions, determinations
of proportionality are not the exclusive province of any single actor in the
sentencing system. Ideally, considerations of proportionality should guide
each decision-maker, including the legislature, the sentencing commission,
the prosecutor, the trial court, and the appellate court. But it is the
judgments of the sentencing commission, reflected in presumptive
guidelines, and those of courts, reflected in departures or modifications on
appeal, that will be most important to sentencing outcomes.35 And between
30. Id. § 7.XX(3)(b), at 265.
31. Id. § 7.07B cmt. i., at 306.
32. Id, § 7.ZZ(2) at 318; id. § 7.ZZ(6)(b). This provision has been submitted to the American
Law Institute (ALI) for discussion purposes, but it has not been presented for formal approval.
33. Id. § 7.ZZ cmt. g., at 329; see also id. §1.02(2) cmt. d., at 10–11.
34. Id. § 7.ZZ cmt. g., at 329–30. That the Code’s drafters are more concerned with overly
severe sentences than with unduly lenient ones is suggested by an asymmetry between the grounds
for appeal and the authority of the appellate court. Either the defendant or the government may
appeal a sentence as too severe or too lenient, id. § 7.ZZ(2), but the appellate court is authorized to
modify a sentence only on the grounds of excessive severity, id. § 7.ZZ(6)(b).
35. Of course, the legislature could take control over proportionality assessments by enacting
strict mandatory sentences. The revised Code disapproves of mandatory sentences, as will
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the sentencing commission and the courts, the latter has the last word: “the
sentencing guidelines should be viewed as ‘first drafts’ of proportionate
sentences for ordinary cases, not as final pronouncements for all cases.”36
C. Evidence-Based Sentencing
So far, I have focused on the interpretation and implementation of the
new Code’s proportionality requirement. But the new sentencing
provisions also offer extensive guidance on the implementation of other
purposes identified in § 1.02. Of particular interest—and, I suspect, of
greatest practical impact—is a broad commitment to the collection and
dissemination of information: to transparency in the sentencing system, to
research on the consequences of different kinds of penalties, and to
“impact statements” that measure and forecast prison populations, fiscal
costs, and the distribution of penalties among different demographic
groups.37 In the new sentencing provisions, information collection and
analysis is identified as both an end in itself and as a means to other
goals—such as the production of more uniform sentences and the
reduction of racial disparities. Sentencing is not exactly a science, and the
new Code does not pretend that it is. But nor is sentencing strictly an art,
or an exercise in normative moral reasoning. On many sentencing
questions, it is possible to collect and consider relevant empirical data.
Like the proportionality requirement, the emphasis on data was present
in the original Code.38 And as is true of the proportionality requirement,
the new Code provides much more specific guidance on implementation
than did the original Code. With respect to evidence-based sentencing, it is
the sentencing commission rather than the judiciary that has foremost
responsibility for making the aspiration a reality. The commission is
directed to develop “a correctional-population forecasting model” and to
conduct research and data collection across a number of substantive
areas.39 At least once a year, the commission should use the forecasting
model to project “sentencing outcomes”—e.g., how many people will be
sentenced—for existing policies, and the commission should also project
apparently be reflected in the not-yet-drafted § 6B.05. See id. § 6B.03 cmt. f., at 184.
36. Id. § 1.02(2) cmt. b., at 7; see also id. at cmt. d., 10–11 (“The sentencing commission is
not the sole, or even the most powerful, actor in the revised Code’s sentencing structure with
authority to make proportionality determinations. . . . The final arbiters of proportionality in
individual cases, under the revised Code, are the courts.”).
37. See, e.g., id. § 1.02(2)(vii)-(viii); id. § 1.02(2) cmt. n., at 21 (noting the Code’s embrace of
“evidence-based” sentencing).
38. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(g) (1962); see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 1.02(2) cmt. n., at 42 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (noting that the new Code “retains the spirit”
of the original § 1.02(2)(g), “but employs more directive language”).
39. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.04(1)–(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); id.
§ 6A.07, at 133–34. To enable this research, the new Code explicitly provides that the sentencing
commission should employ a research director and supporting staff. Id. § 6A.03(1)–(2), at 84.
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likely outcomes when new policies are introduced.40 The sentencing
commission is also directed to conduct an omnibus review of the
sentencing system every ten years. The omnibus review should address,
among other things, the extent to which the sentencing system is fulfilling
the purposes identified in § 1.02(2).41 In addition to these reports, the
commission is to collect and analyze data on a number of specific
questions, such as the effect of offender and victim characteristics on the
sentence imposed.42
Two areas of data analysis are of particular importance: dollars and
demographics. First, the new Code repeatedly emphasizes the
commission’s role in predicting and reporting the monetary cost of
sentencing policy.43 The commission is to ensure that we have detailed
information about what we are spending to punish. This task is crucial
because as prison populations have steadily increased in the United States,
only one factor seems even partially successful as a source of outer
limits—the price tag.44 If one aim of sentencing reform is a reduction in
the incarcerated population, the promulgation of detailed fiscal impact
statements may be the most effective mechanism to get there. Experience
suggests that dollars are more likely to serve as a limiting principle than
desert.
Second, and perhaps more controversially, the new Code directs
sentencing commissions to investigate discrimination and inequities in the
sentencing system, and to project the racial impact of sentencing policies.45
Demographic projections are one piece of the new Code’s efforts to
“eliminate inequities in sentencing across population groups.”46 The
drafters identify racial and ethnic minorities as “population groups” of
particular interest, but leave the language broad enough to encompass
other “vulnerable groups” that may be subject to discrimination in the
criminal justice system.47 Importantly, the commentary notes that the mere
fact of racial disparities, standing alone, is not sufficient reason to reject a
given sentencing policy.48 In some instances, disparate racial impacts at
40. Id. § 6A.07(1), at 133.
41. Id. § 6A.09, at 147–48.
42. Id. § 6A.05(2)(c), at 100.
43. See, e.g., id. § 6A.07, at 133.
44. This has been most evident in states with huge prisoner populations such as California and
Texas. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37
CRIME & JUST. 207, 207 (2008); see also LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
BEYOND BARS: CORRECTIONAL REFORMS TO LOWER PRISON C OSTS AND REDUCE CRIME, Executive
Summary IV (1998), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/144/report144.pdf; see generally
Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 47, 80–84 (2008).
45. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.05(2)(f), at 100 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); id.
§ 6A.07(3), at 133.
46. Id. § 1.02(2)(b)(iii), at 2.
47. Id. § 1.02(2) cmt. j., at 17–18.
48. See id. § 6A.07 cmt. d., at 138.
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sentencing are the product of racial patterns in criminal behavior.49 But,
some punishment disparities are traceable to bias in the criminal justice
process, and the new demographic impact statements are aimed to “force[]
these facts . . . into the open.”50
The sentencing commission is not the only decisionmaker charged with
attention to demographic disparities. For example, a trial court judge may
choose to interpret a statute or guideline in the manner that would
minimize racial or ethnic disparities.51 Still, judges will not necessarily be
well-positioned to assess broad demographic patterns, and the collection of
such data is primarily the responsibility of the sentencing commission.
D. A New Conception (or Two) of Sentencing
The two broad themes of the new Code discussed here—proportionality
and evidence-based sentencing—suggest two different conceptions of
sentencing. The Code’s new account of proportionality assumes that
sentencing requires a moral judgment of the offender’s desert. Sentencing,
on this account, is not a hard science or a mathematical calculation; it
requires discretion, moral reasoning, and the exercise of judgment. Not
surprisingly, though sentencing commissions may offer the first word on
proportionate sentences, judges get the last. In the individual case,
sentencing is a judicial function.
The quest for evidence-based sentencing presents a somewhat different
conception. It assumes that facts matter as much as or more than moral
judgments. Specifically, the new directives to sentencing commissions to
gather and analyze data assumes that sentencers need to know costs,
demographic impact, recidivism statistics, and other facts in order to
choose sentencing policy. Again, the notion of evidence-based sentencing
is not quite a claim that sentencing is a science, but it is a view of
sentencing as much more scientific than a desert judgment.
The two approaches are in some tension. To resolve the tension, it
might be argued that the divergent approaches simply reflect the difference
between the particular case and systemic outcomes. Sentencing as a matter
of desert judgments focuses on the individual offender, while sentencing as
a matter of empirical evidence focuses on aggregate outcomes and the
system as a whole. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, given the
revised Code’s emphasis that proportionality is a matter of comparative or
relative punishment severity. As we explore the nature of sentencing, it is
important to consider both the individual and systemic perspectives. As the
next two parts will suggest, however, desert-based proportionality and
evidence-based sentencing are not easily reconciled.
49. Id. at 138–39.
50. Id. at 139.
51. Id. § 7.XX cmt. b., at 268.
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In short, the revised Code sets forth mechanisms to turn broad goals
into meaningfully different practices. Proportionality—understood as a
deontological limitation on consequentialist goals—and evidence-based
sentencing are important goals, and it is fortunate that the ALI has devoted
substantial efforts toward realizing them. But for all its attention to
practical mechanisms, the MPC sentencing project has paid relatively little
attention to available evidence of the actual operation of desert claims in
sentencing decisions. The next two parts explore the ways in which desert
undermines, or is at odds with, the commitments to proportionality and
evidence-based sentencing.
III. DESPERATELY SEEKING PROPORTIONALITY
For a few reasons, the Code’s new version of a proportionality
requirement is unlikely to lead to changes in American sentencing
practices. First, the new Code equivocates on what proportionality actually
means; the drafters seem reluctant to embrace fully retribution or just
deserts, even as they assume that proportionality is an inherently
retributive idea. Second, if the new MPC proportionality is a desert-based
principle, it will be subject to the indeterminacy and elasticity that have
always plagued desert judgments. Third, there is likely to be considerable
political opposition to any sentencing system that allows judicial
determinations of desert to trump popular desert judgments.
A. Ambivalence about Retribution
By its own terms, § 1.02(2) defines a proportionate sentence as one that
corresponds to offense gravity, harm, and offender culpability. These
factors are listed as three independent considerations, but neither the
Code’s commentary nor broader sentencing literature supports this
characterization. In most accounts, the “gravity” of an offense is itself a
function of the harm to the victim and the offender’s culpability.52 Putting
aside this variation on the concept of offense gravity, the new § 1.02(2)
recreates a juggling act that is characteristic of recent academic discussions
of proportionality and desert. In this act, familiar terms are invoked and
defined in terms of one another; the conceptual insights are few and the
practical upshot is unclear. Proportionality is often defined in terms of
desert, and desert in terms of “offense gravity” or “crime seriousness,” and
crime seriousness in terms of harm and culpability, and culpability in terms
52. In an influential study, Andrew von Hirsch argues for a theory of proportionate sentencing
that makes deserved punishment a function of crime seriousness. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR
FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 45–46
(1985). Crime seriousness, which seems equivalent to the MPC’s term “gravity of the offense,” is in
this account determined with reference to harm and culpability. Id. at 64; see also Donna H. Lee,
Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 567 (2008)
(defining offense gravity as a function of harm, culpability, violence, and magnitude).
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of blameworthiness, and blameworthiness in terms of desert.53 What was
desert, again? It is a matter of moral intuition, on some accounts; on others,
it is a “placeholder” for still other values.54 As a grand finale to the
juggling act, desert is sometimes simply equated with justice—as though
justice were itself a transparent and uncontested notion.55
Perhaps it is unfair to lump together so many different accounts of
desert, some of which reflect careful attempts to achieve conceptual
clarity. More charitably, one might say that criminal desert is typically
described as a function of crime seriousness (or offense gravity), which is
itself the product of two components: the tangible harm of the crime, and a
less tangible factor described as culpability or blameworthiness. But even
on this account, desert remains elusive. Harm is meaningful only up to a
point; we might agree that murders and rapes cause harm, but the harm of
many other offenses is a matter of continuing dispute.56 Culpability or
blameworthiness is still more inchoate, and sentencing theorists tend to
focus on whether certain factors are relevant to culpability instead of
explaining what culpability is.57 Even when one strives to be charitable, it
is difficult to escape the conclusion that desert theory takes a widely held
but imprecise intuition that wrongdoers should be punished and attempts,
without much success, to impose onto this intuition philosophical rigor.
Somewhere in the resulting theory, couched in the language of culpability,
blameworthiness, moral wrong, desert, or justice, one always reencounters
the original mushy intuition.

53. See ANDREW ASHWORTH & ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PROPORTIONATE S ENTENCING (2005);
HIRSCH, supra note 52, at 34–36, 64; Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against
Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 708–10 (2005).
54. See generally MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1997) (connecting desert to moral intuitions, but also arguing that moral judgments can be
objectively true). I have discussed the indeterminancy of desert in more detail elsewhere. See Alice
Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. C RIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1308–
13 (2006) [hereinafter Desert, Democracy]; Alice Ristroph, The New Desert, in C RIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 47–48, 173–74 (Paul Robinson et al. eds, 2009).
55. Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as
Controlling Crime, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009); see also Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating
Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 564 (2008) (arguing that
Eighth Amendment proportionality is based on a “felt sense of justice”).
56. Bernard Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
109, 139–40 (1999).
57. “In sentencing, however, the concept [of culpability] has hardly been studied.” VON
HIRSCH, supra note 52, at 71. von Hirsch does not offer a conception of culpability, but does
identify relevant considerations: the actor’s mental state, including both his motives and any
significant mental disability, and the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances such as
necessity or duress. Id. at 71–73; see also Lee, supra note 52, at 571–72 (following von Hirsch, but
adding age, education, drug dependence, and employment records as relevant determinants of
culpability).
VON
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B. The Elasticity of Desert Revisited
The charge that desert is incoherent or indeterminate is not new;
indeed, the theory of limiting retributivism is, in part, an effort to answer
precisely that charge. Though desert cannot tell us exactly how much to
punish, the limiting retributivism argument goes, it can tell us that some
punishments are too much (or too little). A related defense of desert
focuses on empirical findings that people assess the relative seriousness of
offenses consistently. The “empirical desert” literature claims that these
popular judgments should serve as the basis for sentencing policy.58 When
the juggling is finished, the concrete claims of both theories turn out to be
relatively modest. As punishments approach extremes of severity or
lenience, people will tend to object to the sanctions as too much or too
little. And people seem to agree on a rank ordering of common offenses.
Neither claim is particularly surprising, or particularly useful.
Modest as the contributions of limiting retributivism and empirical
desert turn out to be, the new Code deploys both lines of argument. Rather
than define gravity or culpability (or specify the determinants of harm), the
Comment to § 1.02(2) simply depicts proportionality as a question of
“moral intuitions” that “are almost always rough and approximate.”59
Invoking Norval Morris and limiting retributivism, the Comment suggests
that proportionality principles will dictate “a range of permissible
sanctions that are ‘not undeserved.’”60 These judgments may vary
somewhat from one community to the next, but community sentiments can
be empirically assessed to serve as the basis of sentencing policy.
“[P]roportionality limitations in a democratic society are best derived
through cooperative and collective assessment of community sentiment.”61
(Somewhat contradictorily, the new Code also empowers judges to
overrule a community’s collective assessment of desert through the power
of judicial proportionality review, as discussed above.)
As early drafts of the Code revisions have circulated over the past few
years, commentators have focused more attention on § 1.02(2) than any
other aspect of the proposed changes.62 The new statement of sentencing
58. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 66–67 (2007).
59. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt., at 5 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 6; see also id. at 31 (“Across a pluralistic nation, different people draw their moral
instincts from a variety of separate yet (for them) irreducible first principles. [The Code requires]
that there be collective input on ranges of proportionate sanctions through the informed,
experienced, and diverse membership of a sentencing commission.”) (internal citation omitted).
62. See, e.g., VON HIRSCH & A SHWORTH, supra note 53, at 180; Michael H. Marcus, Limiting
Retributivism: Revisions to Model Penal Code Sentencing Provisions, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 295,
312–13 (2007); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 17–21, 59–
60, 69, 81–83 (2003); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85,
86–89 (2003).
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purposes has been critiqued both as too retributive and as not retributive
enough.63 Perhaps more swayed by the former critique, the present draft
self-consciously avoids the term “retribution” and emphasizes that it is not
a codification of just deserts theory.64 Indeed, one gets the sense that the
ALI resigns itself to a form of retributivism as a last resort, as a necessary
means to the end of proportionality restrictions on punishments. If this
account is correct, the ALI members are not alone.65 The renewed
popularity of retributive sentencing theory seems largely motivated by a
search for proportionality limitations on criminal sentences.66 This
roundabout path to reluctant retributivism is likely to end in
disappointment. Desert is not the only or best source of proportionality
restrictions on criminal sentences. Indeed, proportionality principles are
often invoked as limitations on government power outside the context of
punishment, and it is this non-punitive proportionality that is most likely to
limit the power to punish.
Before elaborating on proportionality as a principle of limited
government, it is worth examining the weakness of desert-based
proportionality in more detail. Most importantly, experience shows that
desert does not function as an effective limiting principle. Instead, the
concept of desert is sufficiently elastic that almost any existing sanction
can plausibly be defended as deserved.67
For an illustration, one need look no further than the revised Code’s
commentary. The commentary notes that California is one of a few
jurisdictions to codify retribution as a controlling principle of sentencing,68
but later refers to California’s Three Strikes Law to illustrate the overly
severe sentences that the Code’s new proportionality principle would

63. See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 53, at 180–83 (criticizing new statement of
sentencing purposes as not retributive enough); Marcus, supra note 62, at 301–02 (criticizing new
statement of sentencing purposes as too retributive); Rubin, supra note 62, at 17–20 (same);
Whitman, supra note 62, at 92–95 (same).
64. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), Reporter’s Note 30–31 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 2007) (noting the Code’s avoidance of the “ideologically charged” term “retribution” and its
continuing emphasis on utilitarian principles); id. § 1.02(2) cmt. i, at 17 (“The revised Code does
not codify a ‘just deserts’ philosophy of criminal penalties.”).
65. See, e.g., Kevin Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for
Revision, 6 BUFF. C RIM. L. REV. 525, 556 (2002) (“One of the chief benefits of retributive theory is
that it suggests a proportional ordering of the severity of sanctions.”).
66. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 52, at 532 (endorsing retributivism as a means to the end of
proportionality limitations on sentences); Malcolm Thorburn & Allen Manson, The Sentencing
Theory Debate: Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 278,
310 (2007) (book review) (“[O]ne of us embarked on this project as an unrepentant critic of just
deserts. He is now a convert who accepts the fundamental role of proportionality. . . .”).
67. Here I am drawing on arguments developed at greater length, with detailed examples of
the elasticity of desert, in Ristroph, Desert Democracy, supra note 54, at 1308–13.
68. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Note 31–32 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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disallow.69 Indeed, the Three Strikes Law, infamously applied in Ewing v.
California70 to support a likely life sentence for a shoplifter, has been a
bête-noire for other recent advocates of desert as a limiting principle.71 But
the people who enacted and defended California’s law understood it as a
way to guarantee that repeat offenders would get what they deserved.
Laymen’s retributive principles were reflected in the law’s preamble and in
discussions of the law in the popular media.72 Desert did not limit and
seems to have facilitated Three Strikes in California.
Notably, the renewed attention to desert in Anglo-American sentencing
theory coincided with the explosion of the United States prison population
and the imposition of increasingly severe sentences. Correlation is not
causation, of course, and desert theorists take pains to explain why they are
not to blame for the more severe sentences.73 But the coincidence of the
resurgence in desert theory with the rapid increase in sentence severity
does suggest that, at the very least, desert has failed as a limiting principle.
C. Popular and Elite Conceptions of Desert
The inherent elasticity of desert is not the only reason it has failed as a
limiting principle. Additional complications stem from the fact that
academics and sentencing elites have been unable to claim exclusive
authority over desert determinations. One vision of limiting retributivism is
that judges and other sentencing authorities, informed by scholarly desert
theories, will recognize that American sentences are now harsher than
what is deserved and will reduce sentence severity accordingly. In the eyes
of ordinary citizens, however, many criminals fail to get as much
punishment as they deserve.74 As one California resident described her
support for California’s Three Strikes Law, “TV gives us this 2 1/2 minute
sound bite about the poor soul who stole a piece of pizza, [asking] if he
deserves to spend 25 years to life in prison. Well, the truth of the matter is,
he probably does.”75
This conflict between populist conceptions of desert and academic or
elite conceptions has appeared in many other contexts. Some scholars
argue that reduced sentences in certain American states and in Western
Europe were achieved through the successful implementation of desert as a

69. Id. at 330.
70. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
71. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW
DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 4 (2006); Lee, supra note 53, at 695–99.
72. See Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 54, at 1315–18.
73. VON HIRSCH & A SHWORTH, supra note 53, at 102.
74. See Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 54, at 1311 n. 62.
75. Stephanie Simon, Backers of Three Strikes Unflinchingly Defend Law, L.A. TIMES, July 3,
1996, at A1, A16 (quoting a murder victim’s mother).
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limiting principle.76 But with time, these alleged success stories look less
successful. When elites on sentencing commissions or in other positions of
power have reduced sentence lengths based on their determinations of
desert, they have often been met with active resistance and legislative
pushback.77
It should be noted that this critique of desert—that desert is too elastic
to serve as an effective source of proportionality restraints—echoes
criticisms of utilitarian punishment theory.78 So, for example, some
retributive theorists have acknowledged non-retributive, utilitarian
accounts of proportionality, but they quickly reject those accounts as
insufficiently rigorous to prevent unduly severe, but socially useful,
sanctions.79 The truth may be that all the mainstream justifications of
punishment are subject to the charge of elasticity: applied to real-world
sentencing policies, the theories can and have been invoked to justify
punishments that academic experts believe are excessive.
All of this should suggest that if we are concerned with the scale of the
United States prison population, we should not look to a restatement of
punishment justifications for help. It is unlikely that the problem of too
much punishment stems from a shortcoming of punishment theory—if
anything, we may have too much punishment theory. The plethora of
philosophical apologies for punishment means that rhetoric is available to
defend almost any sentencing policy or any individual punishment. If we
are to reduce the scale of punishment, we do not need more statements of
reasons to punish. Instead, we need more attention to the costs of
punishment and more skepticism about penal power.
D. An Aside: Proportionality Without Desert?
I should be clear that the critique here is aimed at desert, not at the
concept of proportionality per se. I have argued previously that
proportionality should be understood as a principle of limited government
76. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT, 83, 96,
104 ( Michael Tonry ed., 2004).
77. See Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 54, at 1324.
78. See generally F RANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION 60–75 (1995)
(arguing that theories of incapacitation are deployed to justify excessive sentences); Francis Allen,
Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in SENTENCING 110, 114 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von
Hirsch eds., 1981) (criticizing theories of rehabilitation for permitting increasingly severe
sentences); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62 (1974) (criticizing the concept of
dangerousness as too vague to prevent excessive prison sentences); Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst when Doing Its Best, 91 GEO.
L.J. 949, 971–75 (2003) (criticizing deterrence rhetoric as imprecise and as authorizing excessive
sentences).
79. See, e.g., VON HIRSCH, supra note 52, at 31–32 (noting that “[t]he first systematic defense
of the principle of proportionate sanctions was utilitarian,” but finding the utilitarian proportionality
principle “weak and prone to exceptions”); Lee, supra note 53, at 738–39.
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that is independent of particular theories of justified punishment.80 In the
sentencing context, proportionality means that the power to impose
criminal sanctions is limited by various individual interests and political
considerations. Claims that a punishment is disproportionately severe are
most defensible when they are claims that the punishment exceeds the
state’s legitimate power. And it is possible to conceive of limitations on
government powers without adopting particular views of the purposes
underlying specific exercises of those powers. For example, we can
conceive of the power to tax, and limits upon it, without adopting a
particular theory of the purpose of taxation.
Indeed, the idea of proportionality reflected in the new Code is a
peculiar historical and geographical artifact that has dominated AngloAmerican retributive theory in the latter half of the twentieth century. It is
the notion that to speak of proportionality in the same sentence as
punishment requires adoption of a specific account of the purposes of
punishment. As just noted, some retributive scholars recognize nonretributive accounts of proportionality but argue that such accounts are
inferior to retributive proportionality.81 A starker form of this claim has
appeared in the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with
Justice Scalia’s assertion that “[p]roportionality . . . is inherently a concept
tied to the penological goal of retribution.”82 This claim would be news to
many courts around the world that regularly apply proportionality as a
constitutional principle beyond the context of criminal justice.83
Indeed, even United States courts occasionally rely on a notspecifically-punitive concept of proportionality. The requirement in
constitutional doctrine that certain coercive or intrusive state actions be
“narrowly tailored” to serve “compelling state interests” reflects the
principle that state power must be proportional to the interest that allegedly
justifies the power.84 Even more explicitly, the Court’s “congruence and
80. Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263,
263 (2005).
81. See supra note 79.
82. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. For a description of the proportionality principle under the German Constitution, see
David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 689 n.135 (2005) (stating that
“Germany is credited with the invention of proportionality review”). Under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, intrusions on individual rights may be upheld if the intrusions are
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Constitution Act, Part I, 1982, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, §§ 1-4, sched. B (U.K.), as reprinted in
R.S.C., No. 44 (Appendix 1985). Canadian courts apply the “Oakes test” to evaluate intrusions on
individual rights; that test includes an inquiry into whether the means chosen by the government are
proportional to its purpose. Regina v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103, 114 (Can.). For a comparative
constitutional law analysis of proportionality, see Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and
Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. C ONST. L. 583, 602–24 (1999).
84. Ristroph, supra note 80, at 293; see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences,
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proportionality” test asks whether congressional action under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is congruent and proportional to a documented
constitutional violation. Section 5 enforcement powers are triggered by
specific social or political problems (e.g., discriminatory conditions), and
the parameters of those powers are determined by the magnitude of the
relevant problems. “There must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end.”85
Applied to criminal sentences, a similar form of proportionality
analysis would inquire whether the exercise of punitive power was
proportional to the problem or injury that gave rise to the power. As I have
elaborated in greater detail elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s recent Sixth
Amendment sentencing decisions demonstrate a mode of constitutional
analysis that assesses crimes, and their constitutional significance, without
any reference to theories of punishment.86 By focusing on the traditional
elements of crimes—conduct and mental state—we might find a way to
compare crimes to one another and require proportionality without delving
into punishment theory.
Though this broader, non-desert-based proportionality would be
preferable to the apparently retributive proportionality of the MPC
revisions, it should be emphasized that there are risks in relying on any
form of proportionality as a tool of sentencing reform. This becomes clear
when we consider the mechanisms by which proportionality is to limit
sentences. For example, as a guide for legislatures and sentencing
commissions, proportionality is unlikely to lead to considerable changes in
practice; those decisionmakers probably don’t think the sentencing policies
they have already developed are disproportionately severe.
To operationalize proportionality with meaningful results, the new
Code looks beyond commissions and legislatures and empowers judges to
conduct independent proportionality review. If this review is based on
desert assessments, I suspect it is not likely to be any more popular—or
tolerated in democratic systems—than previous attempts to apply elite
conceptions of desert to limit majoritarian choices. Even if the Code’s new
proportionality review were based on a broader conception of
proportionality, many are likely to view such review as an undue assertion
of judicial power against majoritarian choices. In the end, proportionality
returns us to the questions raised in my introduction: what sort of task is
sentencing, and why should it be distinctively judicial? I want to return to
those questions, but to answer them, it is worth first exploring the ways in
which desert analysis may limit the more scientific conception of
sentencing that informs some of the new Code’s provisions.
Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 571, 618–21 (2005).
85. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
86. Ristroph, supra note 80, at 319–27.
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IV. EVIDENCE AND EMPIRICISM
As discussed above, the new Code displays a strong commitment to the
collection and dissemination of information. It calls for transparency in the
sentencing system, research on the consequences of different kinds of
penalties, and “impact statements” that measure and forecast prison
populations, fiscal costs, and the distribution of penalties among different
demographic groups.87 The Code’s drafters aspired to implement Norval
Morris’s “evidence-based treatment penology.”88 Under this approach,
sentencing is more science than art: it requires the collection and analysis
of empirical data, and it promises to test falsifiable propositions about the
benefits of sentences.
There is an obvious tension between the new Code’s appeals to desert
and its endorsement of “evidence-based sentencing.” Claims of desert are
not falsifiable, whether or not they possess “moral reality” as claimed by
some retributive theorists. And the sort of empirical data to which the
Code urges attention—the financial impact of sentences, or
disproportionate racial impacts—are irrelevant to most theories of desert.
On most accounts, a moral claim that an offender deserves ten years in
prison is not affected by the fact that the state cannot afford to support him,
or that the offender’s incarceration will further exacerbate racial
disproportions in the prison population.
The news may be even worse—judgments of “desert” may serve as an
opportunity for racial bias to enter the criminal justice system. Research on
capital sentencing, a context in which jurors are frequently urged to make a
direct assessment of desert, reveals an unsettling tendency to find black
defendants who kill white victims more deserving of death than those who
commit similar crimes but with a different defendant-victim racial matchup.89
And whatever the causal relationship between the concept of desert and
race and class disparities in sentencing, desert may protect those disparities
from efforts to eliminate them. Most individuals who receive criminal
sentences have done something illegal, even if not the precise offense of
conviction. Hence, even if desert is always based on a finding of illegal
action, we can safely conclude that all those poor, black men in prison
deserved at least some punishment. The color and poverty of our prison
population and death rows are not products of discrimination, the argument
goes, but the unfortunate results of the fact that racial minorities and poor
people are disproportionately involved in criminal behavior. The
87. See supra text accompanying note 37.
88. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 7–8 (Discussion Draft, 2006).
89. Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 54, at 1328–32.
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demographic disparities are too bad, but we have to give these criminals
what they deserve. The new Code accommodates this reasoning with its
insistence that “[p]rojected numerical disparities by race or ethnicity will
not always supply a sound basis for avoiding an otherwise-justified
punishment policy.”90
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp91
provides a stark illustration of the defeat of empiricism by notions of
desert.92 Warren McCleskey challenged his death sentence as a violation of
his right to equal protection. To support his claim, he introduced an
empirical study of death sentences in Georgia that appeared to show
patterns of racial bias.93 The Court dismissed this empirical research as
inconclusive, reasoning that McClesksey had failed to prove that his
particular sentence was a product of intentional discrimination.94
Famously, the Court “decline[d] to assume that what is unexplained is
invidious.”95 A theory of desert enables this choice to give the benefit of
the doubt to the sentencer even in the face of empirical evidence of racial
disparity. It is easier to ignore unexplained and seemingly invidious
patterns if we are confident in the overall justice of what we do, and the
notion of desert provides that confidence. In short, desert-thinking may
contribute to biases, and even if it does not, it provides a safe harbor for
racial disparity.
The moral warranty offered by desert may also sometimes insulate
sentencing practices from charges of disutility. Strong public support for a
particular utilitarian policy may shape public conceptions of deserved
punishment, as apparently occurred in the case of California’s Three
Strikes Law. At the same time, more contested claims of utility or disutility
may not be subjected to rigorous scrutiny if we can avoid the conflict by
retreating to desert. In fact, given that conceptions of deserved punishment
are easier to expand than contract, sentencing policies originally motivated
by utilitarian concerns may become immune to claims of disutility once we
have convinced ourselves that the sentences are deserved. This
phenomenon may be evident with respect to long prison sentences for
recidivists. In many instances, the policy choice to require such sentences
was originally motivated by a perceived need to incapacitate dangerous
offenders, but quickly justified in terms of desert as well. Recent research
suggests that these lengthy prison terms may do little to reduce crime,
because offenders are incarcerated long past the age at which they are
90. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.07 cmt. d,138 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
91. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
92. Id. In this paragraph and the next, I reprise arguments I first made in Ristroph, supra note
54, at 1336.
93. 481 U.S. at 286–87.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 313.
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likely to commit new offenses.96 But as long as discussions of sentencing
policy are dominated by the rhetoric of desert, any evidence of nonutility
or disutility is likely to have little impact.
When the drafters of the new Code call for “evidence-based penology”
and for more rigorous empirical research, perhaps they hope that the facts
will speak for themselves. Perhaps the hope is that once people see how
much sentences cost, and how little they apparently deter, the only rational
response will be to reduce the length of prison sentences and look for other
alternatives. But facts never speak for themselves. Some decisionmaker
must always assess the significance of facts. Someone must ask, is it
relevant that an increase in the minimum sentence for drug possession will
have this projected effect on the corrections budget? If punishing crack
possession more severely than the possession of powder cocaine puts more
black men in prison, is that itself a reason to change the policy? The
danger of desert is that it preserves the possibility that some will say the
costs are worth it, the inequities deserved.
I should be clear that I do not recommend that we simply redirect our
faith from the gods of desert to the gods of empiricism. As just noted,
empirical evidence always requires interpretation, and interpretation is
always at least partially normative. The facts themselves will not tell us
what to do. Bernard Harcourt has made the related argument that
purportedly falsifiable claims of utility are never adequately justified by
empirical evidence.97 There comes a “moment when the empirical facts
[run] out . . . yet the reasoning continue[s].”98
The inevitable space between theoretical or empirical
premises and the final judgment derives, in the end, from that
imperceptible fissure in the human sciences between the notfalsified, the not-yet-falsified, the apparently unfalsifiable, the
verified but only under certain questionable assumptions, and
truth. In the empirical domain—no less than in philosophical
discourse, legal analysis, and public policy debates—proof
never followed mathematical deduction, but rested instead on
assertions—whether empirical or logical—that may well have
been true, but for which other entirely reasonable hypotheses
could have been substituted.99
96. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate
Sentencing: The Truth About Truth-in-Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509, 510 (2002)
(“Long sentences have little incapacitation effect on crime reduction because prisoners remain
in jail at ages when they would have stopped offending.”).
97. Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment: On the Limits of Reason
and the Virtues of Randomization (A Polemic and Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century), 75 SOC.
RES. 307, 316 (2007).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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But it is one thing to be attentive to the limits of empiricism as a source
of justifications for punishment, and another to dismiss it altogether.100
There are ways in which better information about sentencing might
improve the sentencing process, and it would be unfortunate if a revitalized
rhetoric of desert were to blind us to empirical evidence of the practical
consequences of our sentencing choices.
V. CONCLUSION
So what kind of task is sentencing, and why should judges have more
control over it than legislators, ordinary citizens serving as jurors (or
voters), prosecutors, or sentencing commissioners? The new sentencing
provisions of the MPC rightly imply that sentencing is neither strictly art
nor pure science, but a complex process that requires exercises of
judgment in an atmosphere of political disagreement. At their best (but
unfortunately, not uniformly), the new provisions remind us that the task
of sentencing is not determined by a theory of punishment. In fact,
contrary to the new Code’s presumptions, an official endorsement of a
desert-based theory of punishment might logically imply that sentencing is
not a primarily judicial function, for it is not clear that judges are best
equipped to make determinations of desert.
Sentencing is most appropriately a judicial task if we understand it to
occur in the context of ongoing disputes. In other words, sentencing should
be understood as an act of adjudication. But on this account, thinking like a
sentencer is markedly different from thinking like a punisher. To the
(retributive) punisher, the dispute is over once the offender has been duly
convicted. Once guilt has been established, punishment is implied and the
remaining question is only the scope of desert. The defendant’s continuing
protests, or societal concerns about cost or other consequences of the
sentence, are not relevant to the desert determination.
In reality, the justification of punishment remains contested, even after
a determination of guilt. Indeed, I would argue— and have argued—that
punishment always remains incompletely just, imperfectly legitimate.101
But even among those who disagree with this penological skepticism, there
is disagreement about what, precisely, justifies punishment. More
importantly, punishment is not the only thing a modern state does, and
there is much disagreement about how to fit the enterprise of punishment
within the larger political enterprise. The key point is that after a
conviction, disputes continue. The task of sentencing is a task of
negotiating those disputes.

100. Harcourt makes the same point. See id. at 330–31.
101. See, e.g., Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, supra note 54, at 1351; Alice Ristroph, Respect
and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CAL. L. REV. 601, 621–22 (2009).
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